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NOTES 
CONCEPTUALIZING AND RECONCEPTUALIZING 




The examination of the reporter’s privilege in light of WikiLeaks gives 
rise to several imperative questions.  Could WikiLeaks claim a federal 
reporter’s privilege if the U.S. government were to ask it to disclose the 
sources of its documents?  Does the current federal law on reporter’s 
privilege adequately address new media, such as WikiLeaks?  And if not, 
how should the law evolve to sufficiently accommodate organizations like 
WikiLeaks? 
This Note seeks to answer these questions.  First, this Note advocates 
that WikiLeaks would be able to claim the privilege under current federal 
law.  Second, this Note concludes that the current law on the reporter’s 
privilege has not sufficiently evolved to account for entities like WikiLeaks. 
Third, this Note discusses policy proposals to address the current 
shortcomings and ultimately advocates for a qualified privilege, the scope 
of which is determined by the source’s expectations, where the reporter 
presents the source’s expectations in court on behalf of the source. 
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The largest leak of classified U.S. military documents in U.S. history 
occurred on October 22, 2010.1  Approximately 400,000 U.S. Army reports 
documenting five years of the U.S. war in Iraq were released.2  The 
documents showed that U.S. authorities failed to investigate hundreds of 
reports of rape, torture, and murder committed by Iraqi police and soldiers.3  
Despite U.S. and U.K. officials’ claims that a record of civilian casualties 
did not exist, the documents revealed a log recording over 66,000 
noncombatant deaths.4 
The organization behind this leak was WikiLeaks.5  WikiLeaks is a 
nonprofit media organization that publishes classified government and 
corporate documents with a mission to increase transparency within the 
halls of power through the dissemination of government and corporate 
secrets.6 
Following the release of the Iraq War documents, U.S. government 
officials and political pundits condemned WikiLeaks.7  U.S. Senator Dianne 
Feinstein proclaimed that the organization’s founder, Julian Assange, 
should be criminally prosecuted.8  Senator Joe Lieberman demanded that 
private companies cut off any relationship with WikiLeaks.9  Senator Mitch 
McConnell called Julian Assange a “high-tech terrorist.”10  Newt Gingrich 
 
 1. Baghdad War Diary, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/irq/ (last visited Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 2. See id. 
 3. David Batty, Iraq War Logs:  Live Reaction and WikiLeaks, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 
2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/23/iraq-war-logs-wikileaks. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See About, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 7. See Glenn Greenwald, WikiLeaks Wins Major Journalism Award in Australia, 
SALON (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/11/27/wikileaks_wins_major_
journalism_award_in_australia/singleton/. 
 8. Dianne Feinstein, Op.-Ed., Prosecute Assange Under the Espionage Act, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 7, 2010, at A19. 
 9. Glenn Greenwald, Joe Lieberman Emulates Chinese Dictators, SALON (Dec. 2, 
2010), http://www.salon.com/2010/12/02/lieberman_55/. 
 10. Henry Farrell & Martha Finnemore, End of Hypocrisy:  American Foreign Policy in 
the Age of Leaks, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22 (2013). 
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and Sarah Palin proclaimed that WikiLeaks was an enemy combatant.11  
The Pentagon’s spokesman deplored WikiLeaks for carelessly 
disseminating the leaked documents around the world.12 
Despite the initial outrage among U.S. policymakers, WikiLeaks’ effect 
on U.S. national security and intelligence has been minimal.13  WikiLeaks, 
however, has affected the media landscape, creating a new genre of 
reporting and reinforcing the power of online media.14  Moreover, 
WikiLeaks has challenged the status quo in an area other than U.S. national 
security and journalism:  law. 
Specifically, WikiLeaks has brought new questions to the debate 
surrounding the federal reporter’s privilege.15  The reporter’s privilege 
allows a reporter to refuse to respond to a subpoena that seeks confidential 
information or sources obtained in the newsgathering process16 and to avoid 
being in contempt of court for such a refusal.17  The privilege can be 
asserted in connection with criminal, civil, and grand jury proceedings.18 
Currently, however, the existence of a federal reporter’s privilege is 
debatable.19  There is no federal statute defining the privilege,20 and the 
only U.S. Supreme Court case on the privilege denied its existence.21  
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, nine federal circuit courts have found 
that a reporter’s privilege exists.22  However, the doctrine amongst these 
circuits lacks consistency.23  Thus, the law is unclear and inconsistent even 
for traditional journalists seeking to obtain the privilege.24  The changing 
nature of media further complicates the federal reporter’s privilege because 
it is difficult to define who is considered a reporter under the privilege.25  
The rise of online journalists—including bloggers, tweeters, instagrammers, 
and operators of websites like WikiLeaks—brings new challenges to the 
federal reporter’s privilege.26 
 
 11. Greenwald, supra note 7. 
 12. Batty, supra note 3. 
 13. See Farrell & Finnemore, supra note 10, at 22 (explaining that Former Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates said that WikiLeaks had a minimal impact on U.S. government 
operations). 
 14. CHARLIE BECKETT & JAMES BALL, WIKILEAKS:  NEWS IN THE NETWORKED ERA 13 
(2012). 
 15. See generally Jonathan Peters, Wikileaks Would Not Qualify To Claim Federal 
Reporter’s Privilege in Any Form, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 667 (2011). 
 16. See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Privilege of Newsgatherer Against 
Disclosure of Confidential Sources or Information, 99 A.L.R. 3d 37, 42 (1980). 
 17. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
1221, 1224 (2013). 
 18. See generally Eclavea, supra note 16. 
 19. See infra Part I.A. 
 20. See infra Part I.A.5. 
 21. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 22. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 23. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part II; see also John J. Dougherty, Obsidian Financial Group, LLC v. Cox 
and Reformulating Shield Laws To Protect Digital Journalism in an Evolving Media World, 
13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 287, 290 (2012), available at http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/
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Specifically, the examination of the reporter’s privilege in light of 
WikiLeaks gives rise to several imperative questions.  Could WikiLeaks 
claim a federal reporter’s privilege if the U.S. government were to ask it to 
disclose the sources of its documents?  Does the current federal law on 
reporter’s privilege adequately address new media, such as WikiLeaks?  
And if not, how should the law evolve to sufficiently accommodate 
organizations like WikiLeaks? 
This Note seeks to answer these questions.  Part I of this Note explains 
the history of the federal law on the reporter’s privilege and contextualizes 
WikiLeaks in the altered media and national security landscape.  Part II 
outlines the federal law that addresses the scope of the reporter’s privilege, 
discusses the two opposing arguments regarding whether WikiLeaks would 
be able to claim the privilege under the current legal framework, and 
ultimately agrees with the view that WikiLeaks would be able to claim the 
privilege under current federal law.  Finally, based on the premise that 
federal law has not sufficiently evolved to account for entities like 
WikiLeaks, Part III discusses policy proposals to address the current 
shortcomings.  Ultimately, this Note advocates for a qualified privilege, the 
scope of which is determined by the source’s expectations, where the 
reporter presents the source’s expectations in court on behalf of the source. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF WIKILEAKS 
Part I of this Note outlines the history of the federal reporter’s privilege 
and the development of WikiLeaks amidst the rise of new media and 
increased government classification of national security documents.  Part 
I.A focuses on the purpose of the privilege and outlines the three potential 
sources of the federal reporter’s privilege:  court decisions interpreting the 
First Amendment, Federal Rule of Evidence 501, and proposed federal 
statutes.  Part I.B contextualizes WikiLeaks within the changed media and 
national security landscape. 
A.  The History of the Federal Reporter’s Privilege 
One scholar has noted that the federal reporter’s privilege currently is a 
“many-headed beast”—potentially found in case law interpreting the First 
Amendment, Federal Rule of Evidence 501, and proposed congressional 
legislation.27  This section discusses the privilege’s purpose and outlines the 
privilege’s three possible sources at the federal level.28 
 
files/6RD_Dougherty_287_322.pdf (“[O]nline journalists, bloggers, and other ‘new media’ 
users find themselves lacking clear legal guidance and are especially vulnerable in today’s 
shield law landscape.”). 
 27. Peters, supra note 15, at 672. 
 28. Although the privilege has been codified at the state level in statutes and common 
law in forty-nine states, this Note will focus solely on the privilege at the federal level. See 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 
42 (2005). 
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1.  The Purpose of the Reporter’s Privilege 
Scholars have pointed to two main purposes of the reporter’s privilege.29  
First, similar to other privileges based on occupational status (such as the 
doctor-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege), the reporter’s 
privilege encourages the free and full flow of information into public 
discourse.30  Without some protection over the process by which news is 
gathered and disseminated, the flow of information would be inhibited 
because journalists would be more restrained in their writing, and 
individuals would communicate less openly to reporters.31  A robust press 
is essential to a well-functioning democratic society32 because it allows for 
a strong marketplace of ideas, which enriches public discourse and fosters 
democratic self-governance.33  An informed public opinion is “the most 
potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.”34  Second, other judges and 
scholars assert that the Constitution separates the press and the government, 
and that without the reporter’s privilege, journalists would become an arm 
of the government.35  The remaining sections in this subpart discuss the 
three potential sources of the reporter’s privilege at the federal level. 
 
 29. Erik Ugland, The New Abridged Reporter’s Privilege:  Policies, Principles, and 
Pathological Perspectives, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2010) (“Those supporting the privilege 
have traditionally rooted their arguments in the principle of autonomy and have relied on a 
combination of instrumental and fundamental-rights rationales.  The instrumental arguments 
focus on the free flow of information . . . .  The rights-based arguments . . . suggest that the 
Constitution compels a strict separation between press and government . . . .”); see also infra 
notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
 30. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 515, 535 (2007); see also Stone, supra note 28, at 39 (“The goal of most legal 
privileges is to promote open communication in circumstances in which society wants to 
encourage such communication.”). 
 31. See Stephanie B. Turner, Protecting Citizen Journalists:  Why Congress Should 
Adopt a Broad Federal Shield Law, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 507 (2012); see also 
Stone, supra note 28, at 40 (explaining that communication will be inhibited in the absence 
of the reporter’s privilege).  The main argument against the reporter’s privilege—as well as 
other privileges—is that it deprives the factfinders of relevant evidence. See Stone, supra 
note 28, at 48.  The rules of evidence must balance the needs of the judicial process on the 
one hand and competing societal interests on the other hand. Id. at 48–49. 
 32. See Stone, supra note 28, at 39. 
 33. See Jones, supra note 17, at 1252–53; see also Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 
90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1583–84 (2012) (asserting that media entities contribute to democracy 
and a free society). 
 34. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); see also Turner, supra note 
31, at 507 (claiming that an independent press serves as a necessary check on government 
action). 
 35. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating 
that without some privilege for reporters, the press would be an investigative arm of the 
government); see also Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Déjà Vu All Over Again:  How a 
Generation of Gains in Federal Reporter’s Privilege Law Is Being Reversed, 29 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 13, 14 (2006) (noting that reporters have more credibility when they 
are perceived as having independently collected and reported information); Potter Stewart, 
Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633–34 (1975) (asserting that the Press Clause 
protects the press’s institutional autonomy); Stone, supra note 28, at 39 (explaining that a 
reporter’s privilege is essential to an independent press). 
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2.  Branzburg v. Hayes:  Does the First Amendment Provide for a 
Reporter’s Privilege? 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”36  In 1972, the Supreme Court 
decided its only case interpreting the First Amendment in regards to the 
reporter’s privilege37:  Branzburg v. Hayes.38  In Branzburg, the Court 
denied the existence of a reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment,39 
although a puzzling short concurrence by Justice Powell—the fifth vote 
needed for the majority—has left many wondering whether the First 
Amendment offers some protection for reporters.40 
The Supreme Court consolidated three cases to form Branzburg:  
Branzburg v. Pound,41 In re Pappas,42 and Caldwell v. United States.43  
Branzburg v. Pound featured a reporter, Paul Branzburg, who observed and 
interviewed a group of young people making and using drugs in Kentucky 
and then wrote two news stories about them in a Louisville newspaper.44  
Branzburg was called to testify on two occasions before state grand juries to 
obtain the names of his confidential sources, but he refused to testify.45  
Similarly, in both In re Pappas and Caldwell v. United States, state 
prosecutors subpoenaed two different reporters who were covering the 
Black Panther organization to testify before grand juries to reveal 
confidential information.46  Like Branzburg, Pappas and Caldwell refused 
to testify because they promised their sources that they would not reveal 
their identities.47  Branzburg, Pappas, and Caldwell argued that the First 
Amendment afforded them a privilege to protect their confidential 
informants and their informants’ information.48  The three reporters 
asserted that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information would 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 37. See David Corneil, Harboring Wikileaks:  Comparing Swedish and American Press 
Freedom in the Internet Age, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 477, 513–14 (2011). 
 38. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  However, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to hear 
a case on the reporter’s privilege if it decides to grant certiorari. Lucy McCalmont, Risen 
Lawyers File SCOTUS Petition, POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2014), http:// http://www.politico.com/
blogs/under-the-radar/2014/01/risen-lawyers-file-scotus-petition-181112.html.  Lawyers for 
the New York Times reporter James Risen filed a petition for certiorari in January 2014 
regarding Risen’s ability to claim the privilege. Id. 
 39. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 683–86. 
 40. See infra text accompanying notes 54–62. 
 41. 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970). 
 42. 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971). 
 43. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 44. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667. 
 45. See id. at 667–71. 
 46. See id. at 672–79. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. at 679–80 (“[T]o gather news it is often necessary to agree either not to 
identify the source of information published or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or 
both; . . . if the reporter is nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the 
source so identified and other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably 
deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of the free flow of 
information protected by the First Amendment.”). 
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place a burden on newsgathering, which would outweigh any public interest 
in the information to assist the criminal justice process.49 
Therefore, the central constitutional issue in Branzburg was whether 
requiring reporters to testify before grand juries abridges the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech and press guarantees.50  In a five-to-four 
decision written by Justice Byron White, the Supreme Court held that 
neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision protects 
reporters from disclosing confidential information to a grand jury.51  
Rather, a journalist has the same duty as an ordinary citizen to testify in 
front of a grand jury.52  The Court also denied a reporter’s privilege because 
it would present practical difficulties, such as creating a definition of 
“reporter” under the privilege.53 
Justice Lewis F. Powell joined the majority but wrote a separate 
concurring opinion.54  One commentator has referred to Powell’s 
concurrence as “cryptic”; and, as a result, “no one is quite sure what the 
[Branzburg] decision meant.”55  Justice Powell’s concurring opinion first 
clarified that the Court did not hold that newsmen who are subpoenaed to 
testify before a grand jury are without constitutional rights in safeguarding 
their sources.56  He then said that a newsman who is called to a grand jury 
to give information bearing only a tenuous relationship to the subject of the 
investigation would still be able to file a motion to quash to seek an 
appropriate protective order.57  Justice Powell then claimed: 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the 
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the 
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to 
criminal conduct.  The balance of these vital constitutional and societal 
interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way 
of adjudicating such questions. 
 In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances 
where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.58 
The existence of a federal reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment 
rests on these lines of Justice Powell’s concurrence.59  The federal circuit 
 
 49. Id. at 681.  In the reporter’s privilege context, both reporters, on the one hand, and 
prosecutors or government officials, on the other, claim a need for information.  While the 
reporters argue in favor of the privilege, as a means to encourage the free flow of 
information, the prosecutors or government officials oppose the privilege, as a roadblock to 
obtaining valuable information for criminal prosecutions. 
 50. Markus E. Apelis, Fit To Print?  Consequences of Implementing a Federal 
Reporter’s Privilege, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1369, 1373 (2008). 
 51. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 703–04. 
 54. Adam Liptak, A Justice’s Scribbles on Journalists’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, 
§ 4, at 4. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 710 (footnote omitted). 
 59. See infra notes 70–86 and accompanying text. 
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courts, however, have interpreted these lines of Justice Powell’s opinion 
differently.60  The courts that interpreted his opinion as supporting a 
reporter’s privilege have found a federal reporter’s privilege under 
Branzburg because they believe that Justice Powell provided a vote to the 
dissent, which made it so that a majority of the justices supported some 
form of privilege.61  Those courts that interpreted Justice Powell’s opinion 
as denying a reporter’s privilege have not found a federal reporter’s 
privilege under Branzburg.62 
Justice Potter Stewart’s dissent advocated for a reporter’s privilege and 
outlined its scope.63  Justice Stewart claimed that the reporter’s privilege 
stemmed from the broad societal interest in the full and free flow of 
information to the public that is central to achieving the First Amendment’s 
goals.64  He devised a three-part test to determine whether a journalist 
would qualify under the privilege.65  Under Stewart’s test, the government 
must demonstrate the following for a reporter to be unable obtain the 
privilege:  (1) that there is probable cause to believe that the reporter has 
relevant information about a specific probable violation of law; (2) that the 
reporter’s information cannot be obtained through other means; and (3) a 
compelling interest in the information.66  In addition to Justice Stewart’s 
dissent, Justice William O. Douglas dissented separately to advocate for an 
absolute reporter’s privilege.67  He argued that reporters would become an 
arm of the government without an absolute privilege.68 
3.  Branzburg’s Progeny:  The Circuit Split 
According to one commentator, Branzburg is “one of the most 
misunderstood cases in the history of the Supreme Court.”69  The lower 
courts’ interpretations of Branzburg are conflicting.70  The Sixth71 and 
 
 60. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 61. See infra notes 76–86 and accompanying text. 
 62. See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725–52 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined Stewart’s dissent. See id. at 725. 
 64. See id. at 725–27. 
 65. See id. at 743. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Apelis, supra note 50, at 1374. 
 68. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 722 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 69. Scott J. Street, Poor Richard’s Forgotten Press Clause:  How Journalists Can Use 
Original Intent To Protect Their Confidential Sources, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 463, 494 
(2007). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
the acceptance of a qualified reporter’s privilege would be equal to substituting the dissent in 
Branzburg for its holding).  However, despite the Sixth Circuit’s holding, the district courts 
within the Sixth Circuit are split on the existence of the privilege. Compare In re 
DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 395, 400–02 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that 
the court is bound by the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that a reporter’s privilege does not exist), 
with Southwell v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., 949 F. Supp. 1303, 1312 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding 
that a qualified privilege exists under certain circumstances). 
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Seventh Circuits72 have rejected the existence of a reporter’s privilege.  The 
Eighth Circuit has not made an explicit ruling on the issue,73 although some 
of the district courts within the Eighth Circuit have recognized the 
privilege.74  Nine circuit courts have found a qualified reporter’s 
privilege.75  Interpreting the majority opinion in Branzburg as a plurality 
opinion because of the belief that Justice Powell’s concurrence advocated 
for a privilege,76 the District of Columbia,77 First,78 Second,79 Third,80 
Fourth,81 Fifth,82 Ninth,83 Tenth,84 and Eleventh85 Circuits have all 
 
 72. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A large number of 
cases conclude, rather surprisingly in light of Branzburg, that there is a reporter’s 
privilege . . . .”).  Until the McKevitt decision, most courts within the Seventh Circuit 
accepted a qualified privilege; however, the McKevitt ruling moved the courts within the 
Seventh Circuit away from recognizing the privilege. See Dalglish & Murray, supra note 35, 
at 39.  Moreover, in 2007, the Seventh Circuit stated, “There isn’t even a reporter’s privilege 
in federal cases.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. NCAA, 481 F.3d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 73. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (8th Cir. 
1997) (stating that the question of whether a reporter’s privilege exists is open in the circuit). 
 74. See Richardson v. Sugg, 220 F.R.D. 343, 347 (E.D. Ark. 2004) (holding that the 
court should recognize a First Amendment qualified reporter’s privilege); Cont’l 
Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broad. Co., 583 F. Supp. 427, 433 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (stating that 
the existence of a qualified reporter’s privilege is not in doubt). 
 75. See infra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 968–69 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Although 
the opinion of the Branzburg Court was joined by five Justices, one of those five, Justice 
Powell, added a brief concurrence.  For this reason, we have previously construed Branzburg 
as a plurality opinion.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that 
Branzburg is not controlling in all cases regarding the privilege and that to determine 
whether the privilege applies, courts should look to the facts of each case, “weighing the 
public interest in protecting the reporter’s sources against the private interest in compelling 
disclosure”). 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (1st Cir. 
1988) (establishing a balancing test between the goals of the First Amendment and the 
party’s need for information to establish the privilege). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that to 
protect the important interests of reporters and the public in preserving the confidentiality of 
journalists’ sources, disclosure of confidential information may be ordered in certain 
circumstances). 
 80. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979) (“The strong 
public policy which supports the unfettered communication to the public of information, 
comment and opinion and the Constitutional dimension of that policy, expressly recognized 
in Branzburg v. Hayes, lead us to conclude that journalists have a federal common law 
privilege, albeit qualified, to refuse to divulge their sources.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that the reporter’s privilege recognized by the Supreme Court in Branzburg “is not absolute 
and will be overcome whenever society’s need for the confidential information in question 
outweighs the intrusion on the reporter’s First Amendment interests”). 
 82. See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725–26 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that a reporter has a First Amendment privilege that protects the refusal to disclose 
the identity of confidential informants). 
 83. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
journalist’s privilege recognized in Branzburg is a “‘partial First Amendment shield’ that 
protects journalists against compelled disclosure in all judicial proceedings” (quoting Farr v. 
Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975))). 
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explicitly recognized a reporter’s privilege to varying degrees.86  Therefore, 
Branzburg launched a qualified reporter’s privilege based on the First 
Amendment in many of the lower courts.87  Because of these 
inconsistencies, one scholar has noted that the First Amendment reporter’s 
privilege doctrine post-Branzburg is confusing and ambiguous.88 
4.  A Reporter’s Privilege Under the Federal Rule of Evidence 501 
Because of the confusion that has followed Branzburg, some courts have 
attempted to establish a reporter’s privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 
501.89  Rule 501 states:  “The common law—as interpreted by United 
States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of 
privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise:  the United States 
Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”90  
Courts have reached different results regarding whether Rule 501 extends to 
reporters.91  Some courts have denied the existence of a reporter’s privilege 
based on Rule 501,92 while one circuit court has held that Rule 501 applies 
to reporters.93 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501’s application to reporters was notably 
mapped out in Judge David S. Tatel’s concurring opinion94 in In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller.95  Judge Tatel asserted that Branzburg held 
only that the reporter’s privilege could not be derived from the First 
 
 84. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that a reporter must respond to a subpoena by appearing to testify in court but that 
he may claim his privilege in relationship to particular questions that probe his sources). 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that the standard governing the exercise of the reporter’s privilege provides that information 
may be compelled from a reporter claiming privilege only if the party requesting the 
information can show “that it is highly relevant, necessary to the proper presentation of the 
case, and unavailable from other sources”). 
 86. See Joel G. Weinberg, Supporting the First Amendment:  A National Reporter’s 
Shield Law, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 172 (2006); see also Robert Bejesky, National 
Security Information Flow:  From Source to Reporter’s Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
399, 444 (2012) (explaining that nine circuit courts have recognized a qualified privilege and 
have developed various tests that balance competing interests to ascertain whether source 
disclosure is necessary to court processes). 
 87. See Jones, supra note 17, at 1225. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Dougherty, supra note 26, at 309. 
 90. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 91. See Papandrea, supra note 30, at 560–61. 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 499–500 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is not a source of the reporter’s privilege); Scarce v. 
United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 5 F.3d 397, 402–03 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); 
Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 139 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting the existence of a 
federal common law reporter’s privilege). 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146–47 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that there exists a reporter’s privilege based on Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in 
criminal proceedings); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding 
that there exists a reporter’s privilege based on Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in civil 
proceedings). 
 94. See Papandrea, supra note 30, at 563–64. 
 95. 438 F.3d 1141, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., concurring). 
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Amendment but failed to address whether the privilege could be obtained 
through Rule 501.96  Three years after Branzburg, Congress enacted 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, authorizing federal courts to develop 
evidentiary privileges in federal question cases according to their 
interpretations of the common law in light of reason and experience.97  
Thus, Judge Tatel asserted that today’s reason and experience supports the 
recognition of a reporter’s privilege.98  He said, “To disregard this modern 
consensus in favor of decades-old views . . . would not only imperil vital 
newsgathering, but also shirk the common law function assigned by Rule 
501 . . . .”99  Judge Tatel advocated for a qualified reporter’s privilege, 
which could be overcome if the government proved the existence of three 
factors:  (1) its need for the information; (2) the exhaustion of alternative 
sources; and (3) balancing the harm that the leak caused against the leaked 
information’s value.100 
5.  Proposed Federal Statutes Establishing a Reporter’s Privilege 
In addition to a potential reporter’s privilege based on the First 
Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 501, Congress has proposed 
statutes establishing a qualified reporter’s privilege—most recently, the 
Free Flow of Information Acts of 2009,101 2011,102 and 2013.103 
The Free Flow of Information Act of 2009 proposed a qualified 
reporter’s privilege.104  The House bill stated that a federal entity may not 
compel a “covered person” (a person who qualifies for the privilege)105 to 
provide information unless a court determines by a preponderance of the 
evidence that:  (1) the party seeking to compel production of the 
information has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources; (2) there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the covered person possesses relevant 
information; (3) disclosure is necessary to a criminal investigation or to 
prevent harm; and (4) the public interest in forcing disclosure of the 
information outweighs the public interest in receiving the news.106  
Furthermore, the House bill defined a covered person as one “who 
regularly . . . publishes news or information . . . for dissemination to the 
public for a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood or for substantial 
financial gain.”107  Although the proposed House bill was generally 
 
 96. See id. at 1171. 
 97. See id. at 1166. 
 98. See id. at 1172. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1175. 
 101. See H.R. 985, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 448, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 102. See H.R. 2932, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 103. H.R. 1962, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013).  Approximately thirty-
six states have statutes establishing a reporter’s privilege, but no such statute currently exists 
at the federal level. See Stone, supra note 28, at 51.  State reporter’s shield statutes are 
outside the scope of this Note. 
 104. See H.R. 985; S. 448. 
 105. See H.R. 985 § 4(2). 
 106. See id. § 2. 
 107. Id. § 4(2) (emphasis added). 
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favorable to online media reporters, a reporter who did not publish 
information full time was likely excluded from the bill.108 
The Senate’s proposed bill had a slightly different definition of who 
would qualify for the privilege.109  The Senate defined a covered person as 
someone who, with the primary intent to investigate events and obtain 
material to disseminate information to the public, regularly reports or 
publishes on such matters and has such intent at the inception of the 
newsgathering process.110  Thus, while the Senate’s bill did not require 
reporters to disseminate news for financial gain, the bill still required them 
to report regularly to qualify for the privilege.111 
Although the Free Flow of Information Act of 2009 passed in the House 
of Representatives, it never reached a Senate vote.112  The development of 
WikiLeaks was the main reason for the bill’s failure.113  While the bill’s 
sponsors amended it to explicitly exempt bloggers from protections after 
WikiLeaks,114 some members of the Senate feared that the statute would 
still be interpreted to protect WikiLeaks.115 
In 2011, the bill was reintroduced in the House of Representatives but 
failed in the House and never reached the Senate.116  Proponents of the bill 
cited a number of reasons for its failure, including disagreement over who 
should be considered a journalist and ongoing concerns that an organization 
like WikiLeaks might be covered.117 
The Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, a similar version of the prior 
bills, was introduced in the House and Senate in May 2013 in response to 
the news that the U.S. Department of Justice had secretly subpoenaed 
 
 108. See Dougherty, supra note 26, at 309–10; see also Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart & 
Anthony L. Fargo, Challenging Civil Contempt:  The Limits of Judicial Power in Cases 
Involving Journalists, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 425, 457 (2011) (explaining that part-time 
journalists or bloggers might not have received the same protection as more traditional 
mainstream journalists under the proposed congressional statute). 
 109. See S. 448 § 11(2). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Dougherty, supra note 26, at 309. 
 113. See Stewart & Fargo, supra note 108, at 457–58; see also Paul Farhi, WikiLeaks Is 
Barrier to Shield Arguments, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2010, at C1 (“Until just a few weeks 
ago, news organizations thought they were cruising toward a long-cherished goal:  
Congressional passage of a federal shield law to protect journalists from being forced to 
reveal confidential sources.  Then came Wikileaks.”). 
 114. See Morgan Weiland, Congress and Justice Dept’s Dangerous Attempts To Define 
“Journalist” Threaten To Exclude Bloggers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/07/congress-and-justice-depts-dangerous-attempts-
define-journalist-threaten-exclude; see also Farhi, supra note 113 (discussing that sponsors 
of the bill have signaled that they will draft an amendment that would specifically exempt 
organizations like WikiLeaks that publish sensitive materials). 
 115. See Farhi, supra note 113 (explaining that members of Congress are concerned in the 
wake of the WikiLeaks disclosures that the bill “gives . . . judges too much leeway to 
determine what’s in the ‘public interest’ when it comes to protecting journalists in cases 
involving national security”). 
 116. See H.R. 2932 (112th):  Free Flow of Information Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2932 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 117. See Turner, supra note 31, at 505. 
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personal and work telephone records of some Associate Press reporters.118  
The Senate has changed the language of who would be considered a 
reporter under the bill from earlier versions of the Free Flow of Information 
Act.119  The new bill defines a covered person under four categories:  
(1) anyone with an employment relationship with a news organization for at 
least one year in the past twenty years, or three months in the previous five 
years; (2) student journalists; (3) anyone who has performed substantial 
freelance journalism work in the previous five years; or (4) anyone whom a 
federal judge determines should have the privilege in the interest of justice 
and to protect legitimate newsgathering.120  As this Note is being published, 
the Free Flow of Information Act of 2013 is in two House subcommittees:  
the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 
Investigations and the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and 
the Internet.121  The Senate Judiciary Committee has ordered the bill to be 
reported to the floor.122 
B.  The Development of WikiLeaks 
The changing nature of media in the internet age further complicates the 
federal reporter’s privilege.123  WikiLeaks and its relationship to the 
privilege exemplifies this complexity.124  This section contextualizes the 
 
 118. See Sean Sullivan et al., White House Pushes Media Shield Law As Holder Faces 
Questions on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST (May 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/on-capitol-hill-holder-to-face-questions-on-ap-phone-records-irs-scandal/2013/05/
15/d0dfc52c-bd70-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html; see also Katie Rucke, What Counts 
As ‘Journalism’?  Senate To Decide, MINT PRESS NEWS (Sept. 14, 2013), 
http://www.mintpressnews.com/what-counts-as-journalism-senate-to-decide/168957/ 
(explaining that the Free Flow of Information Act of 2013 was introduced three days after 
the news that the government had secretly subpoenaed two months’ worth of phone records 
from Associated Press staff members and had obtained a confidential search warrant for a 
Fox News journalist’s emails).  In addition to promoting the introduction of the Free Flow of 
Information Act to Congress, the Department of Justice released a guideline report 
governing investigations and other law enforcement matters that involve journalists. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON REVIEW OF NEWS MEDIA POLICIES 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/2202013712162851796893.pdf.  The report 
detailed the Department of Justice’s policy revisions to strengthen protections for members 
of the news media. See id. 
 119. Compare S. 448, 111th Cong. (2009), with S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 120. LEONARD DOWNIE JR., COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE PRESS:  LEAK INVESTIGATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE IN POST-9/11 
AMERICA 22 (2013), available at http://www.cpj.org/reports/us2013-english.pdf. 
 121. See H.R. 1962:  Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1962 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 122. See S. 987:  Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s987 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 123. See Papandrea, supra note 30, at 518–19. 
 124. See Sandra Davidson & David Herrera, Needed:  More Than a Paper Shield, 20 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1277, 1278 (2012); see also Corneil, supra note 37, at 481 
(explaining that American jurisprudence is currently struggling with how to regulate 
WikiLeaks because it is a novel form of journalism).  While WikiLeaks is the most well-
known website that provides leaked information, other similar websites have developed, 
such as UniLeaks, FrenchLeaks, and BalkanLeaks. See LEAK DIRECTORY, 
http://leakdirectory.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).  Furthermore, a few other mainstream 
news organizations have adopted secure leaking technology similar to WikiLeaks, such as 
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development of WikiLeaks in the rise of new media and the 
overclassification of government documents. 
1.  The Rise of New Media 
Over the past decade, traditional print media have faced tremendous 
challenges in the wake of the rise of the internet.125  Since the mid-2000s, 
the print press has declined in both circulation and advertising revenue.126  
Many print newspapers have gone bankrupt or reduced their operations.127  
In addition, the number of local papers and television stations has 
drastically declined, and a small group of media companies owns the 
majority of newspapers and television stations.128 
The decline in print media is largely a result of the internet, which has 
generated online news and nontraditional media sources that serve society’s 
informational needs.129  The internet has fundamentally altered the way 
society disseminates and receives information.130  In addition to online 
versions of traditional newspapers, millions of bloggers, tweeters, podcasts, 
websites, and social media users have supplemented the mainstream news 
media.131  In 2010, approximately 61 percent of Americans received at least 
part of their news from an online source, and 75 percent of online news 
consumers received news through email or social networking sites.132 
In addition, the rise of bloggers and other “citizen journalists” has 
changed the news media landscape.133  While traditional journalists are 
generally subject to formal editorial oversight, citizen journalists generally 
lack such supervision.134  In addition, citizen journalists often lack 
professional journalism training as well as experience in the field, and they 
often publish news stories only periodically.135  Citizen journalists are more 
 
the New Yorker’s Strongbox and the Wall Street Journal’s SafeHouse. See Ed Pilkington, 
Strongbox:  New Yorker’s Salvo in the ‘War Between Data Capture and Privacy,’ 
GUARDIAN (May 17, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/17/new-yorker-
strongbox-aaron-swartz-data-privacy. 
 125. See Levi, supra note 33, at 1537. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Scott Neinas, A Skinny Shield Is Better:  Why Congress Should Propose a 
Federal Reporters’ Shield Statute That Narrowly Defines Journalists, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 
225, 245 (2008). 
 129. See Levi, supra note 33, at 1537–39. 
 130. See Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1341, 1369–70 (2008). 
 131. Kendyl Salcito, New Media Trends, JOURNALISM ETHICS, 
http://www.journalismethics.info/online_journalism_ethics/new_media_trends.htm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 132. KRISTEN PURCELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., UNDERSTANDING THE PARTICIPATORY 
NEWS CONSUMER 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//
Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Understanding_the_Participatory_News_Consumer.pdf. 
 133. See Turner, supra note 31, at 508–11. 
 134. Id. at 510.  Citizen journalists, however, obtain editorial oversight over the internet. 
Id. at 511.  If an individual publishes inaccurate information over the internet, then other 
individuals can choose to comment and instantly correct the mistake. Id. 
 135. Id. at 510–11. 
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likely to express controversial views and criticize traditional journalists’ 
work because they are not editorially supervised.136  Thus, citizen 
journalists are able to fill gaps in mainstream media coverage, thereby 
increasing the full flow of information to the public.137 
2.  Increased Government Classification of Documents 
The classification of information is essential for the government to 
protect public safety.138  If information that merits classification is released, 
whether by mistake or through leaks, the cost to national security can be 
high.139 
Before 1940, military regulations governed classification determinations 
in the United States.140  In 1940, however, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt issued an executive order giving the president authority over the 
classification of military and naval documents.141  In 1951, President Harry 
S. Truman expanded classification authority to all executive agencies.142  
Classification rules have shifted under each new administration.143 
A profound shift in classification rules occurred after the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001,144 which led to a rapid increase of intelligence and 
government agencies to combat terrorism.145  Because the government’s 
national security role has increased after 9/11, both the number of secrets 
and the number of people with access to secrets has greatly expanded.146  
President George W. Bush moved away from a presumption against 
classification to a presumption in favor of classification post-9/11.147  
Previously, President William J. Clinton’s policy was that a document 
should not be classified if there existed significant doubt regarding the 
necessity of its classification.148  However, President Bush deleted this 
provision.149  President Bush also permitted the reclassification of certain 
declassified documents, changing the policies of the Clinton 
Administration.150  Because of these policies, the number of government 
 
 136. Id. at 511. 
 137. Id. at 511–12. 
 138. See ELIZABETH GOITEIN & DAVID M. SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
REDUCING OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 7 (2011), available at 
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 140. See id. at 241. 
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 143. See Papandrea, supra note 139, at 242. 
 144. DOWNIE, supra note 120, at 6. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Cf. Papandrea, supra note 139, at 242. 
 148. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995). 
 149. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003). 
 150. See Papandrea, supra note 139, at 242. 
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secrets has soared.151  In addition, the amount of money the government has 
spent on classification has dramatically increased in the last decade.152  
Even though the Obama Administration reinserted the language from the 
Clinton Administration in its Executive Order regarding classification of 
national security documents,153 the culture within the Obama 
Administration does not favor such disclosure in practice.154 
Yet, government officials claim that a majority of the classified 
documents should not be classified.155  The director of the Information 
Security Oversight Office156 testified before Congress, claiming that “it is 
no secret that the Government classifies too much information” and that, in 
his experience, “many senior officials . . . candidly acknowledge the 
problem of excessive classification . . . .”157  In addition, WikiLeaks 
provides anecdotal evidence of the phenomenon because analyses of the 
leaked documents revealed hundreds of thousands of documents that should 
not have been classified.158 
Commentators have suggested four main reasons for 
overclassification.159  First, government culture encourages document 
classification.160  Second, some government agencies wish to conceal 
information that would reveal government misconduct or incompetence.161  
Third, because officials risk sanctions or public condemnation for revealing 
sensitive information, they are pressured to classify documents.162  Fourth, 
 
 151. See Dalglish & Murray, supra note 35, at 37.  The Edward Snowden leaks provide 
further anecdotal evidence of increasing government secrecy.  In June 2013, Edward 
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 153. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) (stating that a 
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 154. DOWNIE, supra note 120, at 4. 
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counterintelligence and security and the 9/11 Commission co-chair estimate that between 50 
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 156. The Information Security Oversight Office oversees the government’s security 
classification system. See Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
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Reform, 108th Cong. 28 (2004) (statement of J. William Leonard, Director, Information 
Security Oversight Office); see also DOWNIE, supra note 120, at 26. 
 158. See Patricia L. Bellia, Wikileaks and the Institutional Framework for National 
Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1524 (2012); see also McCraw & Gikow, supra 
note 155, at 485–86. 
 159. See GOITEIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 2. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. 
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there is little review of classification decisions163 and, even when there is 
adequate review, the classification system does not create incentives to 
challenge improper classification.164 
3.  The History of WikiLeaks 
WikiLeaks is a global, nonprofit, internet-based media organization that 
publishes corporate and government documents otherwise unavailable to 
the public.165  WikiLeaks was launched in 2007 with a mission to defend 
free speech, improve the common historical record, and support human 
rights around the world.166  WikiLeaks also provides an innovative, secure, 
and anonymous way for sources to leak information.167  WikiLeaks accepts 
leaked material in person or through its electronic drop box and publishes 
original documents alongside news stories.168  Julian Assange, an 
Australian antiwar activist and former hacker, founded WikiLeaks.169  
Assange remains WikiLeaks’ spokesman.170  To further its mission, 
WikiLeaks promotes its stories to mainstream news outlets.171  WikiLeaks 
claims to only publish documents that reveal abuses within the government 
and corporate spheres, and it verifies the accuracy of all submitted 
documents.172 
Since its development, Wikileaks has published a range of documents.173  
In 2007, WikiLeaks published the U.S. Army’s Guantánamo Bay detention 
center operating procedures.174  In 2008, WikiLeaks published documents 
regarding a Swiss bank’s money-laundering activities, as well as the 
contents of Sarah Palin’s email account.175  Since 2010, WikiLeaks has 
focused on releasing classified U.S. government documents.176  In April 
2010, WikiLeaks released classified U.S. military video footage of three 
 
 163. See DOWNIE, supra note 120, at 26. 
 164. See GOITEIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 2. 
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helicopter strikes in Baghdad.177  The video had approximately 2 million 
views on YouTube and was played in the news hundreds of times.178 
In July and October 2010, WikiLeaks released its most notorious 
documents—the “Afghan War Diary” and the “Iraq War Log”—which 
contained over 90,000 U.S. military documents related to the war in 
Afghanistan and 400,000 U.S. military documents related to the Iraq 
War.179  The documents from Afghanistan detailed how the United States 
lacked the resources to effectively wage the war in Afghanistan and 
revealed information regarding the Pakistani intelligence service’s 
connections to the Taliban.180  The documents from Iraq were mostly low-
level, confidential U.S. army field reports.181  This release was the largest 
leak of classified data in U.S. history182 and drew comparisons to the 
infamous Pentagon Papers that were leaked during the Vietnam War.183 
The U.S. government responded to WikiLeaks’ document release with 
outrage.184  For example, the chairman of the Committee on Homeland 
Security in the House of Representatives asserted that Julian Assange was 
an enemy of the United States and should be prosecuted.185  However, 
despite these outcries, Julian Assange has not been arrested in connection 
with WikiLeaks, and no charges have been brought against the website 
directly.186  Moreover, scholars and political officers have asserted that 
WikiLeaks had little effect on the United States’ national security and 
foreign policy agenda.187 
Despite having only a small effect on international relations, one scholar 
has noted that WikiLeaks has advanced journalism.188  Although politically 
motivated journalism and leaking are not new, WikiLeaks published an 
unprecedented number of documents around the world in a very short time 
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period.189  In addition, WikiLeaks’ collaboration with mainstream media 
outlets was an innovation in journalism.190  To exploit the mainstream 
media’s brands and large audiences, Julian Assange decided to work with 
traditional journalists to have a greater political impact around the world.191  
WikiLeaks was able to use the scale and reach of the internet while also 
harnessing mainstream media’s connections to a mass audience and 
networks of powerful individuals.192 
II.  APPLYING THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE TO WIKILEAKS 
The rise of online journalism—such as WikiLeaks—brings new 
questions to the federal reporter’s privilege debate.193  One of these 
questions is whether WikiLeaks could claim a federal reporter’s privilege if 
the U.S. government were to ask WikiLeaks to disclose the sources of its 
documents.194  This Part addresses the two competing arguments regarding 
whether WikiLeaks could claim the reporter’s privilege under the current 
legal framework.  Part II.A discusses the federal law that outlines the scope 
of the privilege.  Part II.B presents the first perspective—the view of 
scholars John Peters, Kellie Clark, and David Barnette—which argues that 
WikiLeaks would not be able to claim the privilege under the current 
federal law on the scope of the reporter’s privilege.  Part II.C discusses the 
contrary perspective of scholar Yochai Benkler, who contends that 
WikiLeaks would be able to claim the privilege under the current law, and 
the views of scholar Mary-Rose Papandrea and others who claim that 
WikiLeaks has some of the characteristics needed to obtain the privilege.  
Part II.D ultimately concludes that WikiLeaks would be able to claim the 
privilege. 
A.  The Scope of the Reporter’s Privilege 
In Branzburg, the Court decided not to extend the reporter’s privilege 
under the First Amendment because, among other reasons, the Court 
acknowledged that if it granted the privilege, then it would also have to 
determine who qualified as a reporter under the privilege.195  The Court 
believed that determining this classification would be a difficult and 
uncertain task.196  Justice White said: 
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We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey 
to such an uncertain destination.  The administration of a constitutional 
newsman’s privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties 
of a high order.  Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those 
categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege . . . .197 
Thus, the Court presciently outlined what it viewed as a major conceptual 
difficulty in granting the privilege.198 
This section discusses the federal case law that defines the scope of the 
privilege.  Part II.A.1 outlines the Supreme Court’s broad view of the 
definition of a reporter as detailed in Branzburg v. Hayes.  Part II.A.2 
discusses the legal framework that has emerged in the federal circuit courts. 
1.  The Broadest Scope of the Federal Reporter’s Privilege:   
Dicta in Branzburg 
The Branzburg Court believed that defining the privilege narrowly would 
be “a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty 
of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or 
a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who 
utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.”199  The Court asserted that 
the freedom of the press is a fundamental personal right that is not solely 
confined to those working for the institutional media.200  Rather, the press 
includes every sort of publication that disseminates information to the 
public.201  According to the Court in Branzburg, if the privilege were 
granted, almost any author would be able to claim the privilege because the 
reporter would be able to demonstrate that he contributes information to the 
public, relies on confidential sources to gain information, and that his 
sources will be silenced if he is forced to disclose their identity before a 
grand jury.202 
2.  The Federal Circuit Courts’ Approaches to Defining the 
Scope of the Reporter’s Privilege 
Of the nine federal circuits that have established a qualified privilege, 
only five have determined who is considered to be a journalist for the 
purpose of the privilege.203  In Von Bulow v. Von Bulow,204 the Second 
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Circuit held that to obtain the privilege, an individual must have had the 
intent to disseminate to the public the information that he or she collected at 
the inception of the newsgathering process.205  Prior experience as a 
professional journalist may be persuasive evidence of present intent to 
gather information for the purpose of dissemination, but it is not 
determinative.206  An inexperienced reporter may still obtain the 
privilege.207   
In Shoen v. Shoen,208 the Ninth Circuit adopted the Von Bulow test.209  In 
the Ninth Circuit, the test is whether the person who wishes to obtain the 
privilege had the intent to disseminate to the public the information sought 
and whether that intent was present at the beginning of the newsgathering 
process.210  If both of these conditions are satisfied, then the privilege may 
be granted.211  Moreover, similar to the Von Bulow court, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the reporter’s privilege is designed to protect investigative 
reporting regardless of the medium used to report the news to the public.212  
The Ninth Circuit said, “What makes journalism journalism is not its format 
but its content.”213 
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits focus on the activity of the person 
who wishes to invoke the privilege, rather than the professional affiliation 
of that person.214  In addition, both “circuits believed the reporter’s 
privilege protect[s] a particular type of journalism—investigative reporting” 
and implicitly require the information to be news.215  Yet, these circuits did 
not define investigative reporting.216 
The Third Circuit has also addressed the privilege’s scope.217  In In re 
Madden,218 the Third Circuit used the principles discussed in Von Bulow 
and Shoen to create a three-part test.219  The Madden court held that to 
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obtain the privilege, a person must satisfy that he or she:  (1) is engaged in 
investigative reporting; (2) is gathering news; and (3) possesses the intent to 
disseminate this news to the public at the beginning of the newsgathering 
process.220  While this test seemingly would require the Third Circuit to 
define “investigative reporting” and “news,” the Third Circuit did not 
define these ambiguous terms.221 
In addition, two other circuits have adopted a similar framework to the 
one found in Von Bulow, Shoen, and Madden.222  From these cases, four 
principles defining the privilege’s scope have emerged:  (1) the medium 
alone does not determine whether a person qualifies as a reporter; (2) the 
person asserting the privilege must have the intent to disseminate 
information to the public at the beginning of the newsgathering process; 
(3) the person asserting the privilege must be engaged in investigative 
reporting; and (4) the content the person disseminated must be news.223  
The remainder of this Part discusses whether WikiLeaks would be able to 
claim the reporter’s privilege in light of these four main principles. 
B.  Perspective One:  WikiLeaks May Not Claim 
the Federal Reporter’s Privilege 
This Part outlines the argument that WikiLeaks cannot claim the 
reporter’s privilege, as articulated by Peters, Clark, and Barnette, that 
WikiLeaks does not engage in investigative reporting because it only 
dumps documents.224  Under the principles established in Von Bulow, 
Shoen, and Madden, WikiLeaks could clearly meet the first, second, and 
fourth requirements.225  Under the first principle, WikiLeaks’ operation on 
the internet does not affect whether it would be able to obtain the 
privilege.226  Moreover, under the second and fourth principles, WikiLeaks 
intends to bring important news to the public and the content disseminated 
on its website is news.227  However, the third principle—that the person 
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asserting the privilege must be engaged in investigative reporting—is 
problematic when applied to WikiLeaks.228 
Although WikiLeaks is a media organization and may have adopted 
some characteristics similar to traditional journalists, Peters, Clark, and 
Barnette contend that WikiLeaks is not engaged in investigative 
reporting.229  Investigative reporting involves more than simply putting 
documents on a website.230  Investigative reporting often involves in-depth, 
long-term research, and multiple-article reporting based on extensive 
interviewing or undercover surveillance.231  Furthermore, when 
investigative reporters disseminate news to the public, their stories not only 
describe events but also provide interpretation or analysis.232 
Peters claims that federal court decisions support this meaning of 
investigative reporting.233  In Cusumano v. Microsoft,234 the First Circuit 
granted the privilege to two business professors who conducted interviews 
prior to writing a book about the competition between two companies.235  
The First Circuit held that these interviews were protected under the 
reporter’s privilege because the sole purpose of the interviews was to gather 
data so that the business professors could analyze and report their findings 
about these two corporations’ management practices.236  In Summit 
Technology, Inc. v. Healthcare Capital Group, Inc.,237 the District of 
Massachusetts extended the privilege to a financial advisor’s reports, which 
contained independent research, analysis, and conclusions.238  Similarly, in 
Blum v. Schlegel,239 the Western District of New York held that a law 
student who was a reporter for a law school newspaper was able to obtain 
the privilege because the article at the center of the case exposed and 
described, in the student’s own words, a controversy at the school and 
quoted some of the people involved.240 
In addition, Peters cites two decisions from the District Court for the 
District of Columbia that clarified the meaning of investigative reporting.241  
In U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. McGraw-Hill Cos.,242 
the court granted the privilege to a publisher that produced indices and price 
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ranges in the natural gas market.243  The U.S. Commodity Future Trading 
Commission argued that the publisher did not qualify under the privilege 
because it simply provided the results of a mathematical formula rather than 
making editorial judgments.244  The court, however, held that because the 
publisher took into account extramarket factors, it did not merely report 
data but engaged in journalistic analysis and judgment.245  Peters claims 
that the court extended the privilege to the publisher in light of this 
journalistic analysis.246  In Tripp v. Department of Defense,247 the court 
applied the privilege to a writer for a military publication.248  The court said 
that interviewing individuals is “an activity which is a ‘fundamental aspect’ 
of investigative journalism.”249  Thus, Peters asserts that the federal case 
law illustrates investigative reporting as something that involves more than 
the mere dumping of documents.250 
Peters, Clark, and Barnette assert that WikiLeaks does not engage in the 
type of investigative reporting that the case law describes.251  Rather, 
WikiLeaks solicits sources to supply leaked material, which it then 
publishes and disseminates to the public.252  Stories and their corresponding 
documentation are brought to WikiLeaks solely for publication.253  Once 
the document is verified for authenticity,254 it is posted on the WikiLeaks 
website with a related story.255  The related story simply announces that the 
website has published certain documents, rather than providing a narrative 
or commentary on the released documents.256  WikiLeaks then relies on the 
mainstream media, such as the New York Times and the Guardian, to 
publish traditional news stories analyzing the documents.257  WikiLeaks 
neither engages in extensive interviewing for news stories nor provides 
meaningful context or journalistic analysis of the leaked documents.258  
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Therefore, these scholars argue that WikiLeaks fails to engage in the 
elements of investigative reporting and cannot obtain the reporter’s 
privilege.259 
C.  Perspective Two:  WikiLeaks May Claim 
the Federal Reporter’s Privilege 
Currently, federal courts have not addressed whether bloggers and other 
new-media journalists may obtain the privilege.260  However, using the four 
principles derived from the federal case law, Benkler and Papandrea claim 
that WikiLeaks has some of the characteristics needed to claim the 
privilege.261  This section explores these scholars’ arguments. 
1.  Because the Medium in Which News Is Disseminated Is Not 
Determinative, WikiLeaks May Claim the Privilege 
The Branzburg Court noted in dicta that an individual does not have to be 
a member of the institutionalized press to invoke the privilege.262  The 
federal circuit courts that have ruled on this issue have also held that the 
medium in which the news is circulated is irrelevant in determining whether 
the privilege applies.263  Today, journalistic activity is largely performed by 
“the modern ‘lonely pamphleteer’ with a smart phone and a Twitter 
feed.”264  Thus, even though WikiLeaks is an online publication, Benkler 
maintains that it may still claim the privilege.265 
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2.  WikiLeaks Disseminates News and WikiLeaks Has the Requisite Intent 
To Disseminate Information to the Public 
First, WikiLeaks disseminates news.266  Second, Benkler argues that 
WikiLeaks possesses the requisite intent to disseminate information to the 
public.267  Although prior experience as a professional journalist may be 
persuasive evidence of present intent to gather information for the purpose 
of dissemination, it is not determinative.268  Therefore, WikiLeaks can 
possess the requisite intent because one does not have to be a professional 
journalist to satisfy this element.269  Furthermore, Benkler notes, “There 
simply cannot be the remotest doubt that the entire purpose of Wikileaks is 
the gathering of information for public dissemination.”270  WikiLeaks’ goal 
is to give people access to information to increase government 
transparency.271  In addition, WikiLeaks’ use of traditional media outlets to 
help disseminate its information to a wider audience further demonstrates 
that its goal is to disseminate information to the public.272  Moreover, even 
though WikiLeaks may possess a political agenda and have other intentions 
apart from public dissemination—such as weakening governments that 
operate in secrecy—WikiLeaks still possesses the intent necessary to 
qualify for the privilege.273 
3.  WikiLeaks Engages in Investigative Reporting 
Scholars have argued that WikiLeaks is different from the traditional 
media because WikiLeaks does not engage in the traditional investigative 
journalistic practice of analyzing and contextualizing the information that it 
publishes.274  However, Papandrea asserts that it is inaccurate to claim that 
WikiLeaks does not engage in traditional investigative journalistic 
practices.275  For example, WikiLeaks’ release of its “Collateral Murder” 
video, depicting a helicopter shooting at targets below during the Iraq War, 
occurred at the National Press Club, where Julian Assange extensively 
commented on the video.276  While WikiLeaks did not initially filter the 
files it obtained, WikiLeaks now filters the material to determine what it 
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should publish.277  In addition, WikiLeaks has sought guidance from the 
government on what names and identifying information it should redact 
from its materials in order to avoid harming individuals.278  Thus, 
WikiLeaks engages in investigative reporting. 
D.  Taking Sides:  WikiLeaks May Claim the Federal Reporter’s Privilege 
Under the Existing Federal Law Because WikiLeaks Engages in 
Investigative Journalism 
The debate on whether WikiLeaks may claim the privilege ultimately 
turns on whether WikiLeaks engages in investigative journalism.279  This 
section maintains that WikiLeaks may claim the reporter’s privilege under 
existing federal law because WikiLeaks engages in investigative 
journalism.280  First, Peters’s analysis of the case law defining investigative 
reporting is problematic because it does not unambiguously support the idea 
that investigative journalism requires analysis, interpretation, interviewing 
witnesses, and in-depth research.  Second, even if Peters’s analysis of the 
case law interpreting the definition of investigative journalism is accurate, 
WikiLeaks still engages in investigative journalism under this definition.  In 
Part III, this Note maintains that the characteristic of investigative 
journalism is inadequate to address the complexities of today’s media 
landscape. 
1.  The Case Law Ambiguously Defines Investigative Journalism 
Peters cites five cases that he asserts further clarify the definition of 
investigative journalism.281  However, these cases do not support his 
assertion that investigative journalism requires analysis and in-depth 
reporting.282  The majority of the cases that Peters cites merely describe the 
published information that received the privilege as containing analysis or 
involving in-depth reporting.283  In these cases, however, the court does not 
link the content’s analytic quality to its rationale for why it extended the 
privilege or to the definition of investigative reporting.284 
In his discussion of Cusumano v. Microsoft,285 Peters fails to provide 
essential context to the First Circuit’s extension of the reporter’s privilege 
to academics engaged in prepublication research.  Peters asserts that the 
Cusumano court held that the professors’ interview of a corporation’s 
personnel was covered under the privilege because the interview’s sole 
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purpose was to gather data to be analyzed and reported.286  Peters’s 
argument emphasizes the analysis component of the court’s statement.287  
However, the court, prior to this assertion, said that it does not matter 
whether the person disseminating news is a member of the media or 
academia so long as he intended to disseminate information to the public at 
the inception of the newsgathering process.288  Therefore, the court held 
that the academics should be entitled to the privilege because their purpose 
was to report their research findings to the public.289  The court was merely 
describing the professors’ newsgathering process to include analysis, but 
the fact that the professors were engaged in analysis was not the court’s 
rationale for why they obtained the privilege.290  Furthermore, the court did 
not define investigative reporting in this case.291 
In Summit Technology, the court extended the privilege to an individual 
who publishes reports on companies and their products.292  The court 
reasoned that the research for the individual’s reports came in part from his 
speaking to other people.293  While the court concluded that the individual 
disseminated investigative information, it did not explain the rationale for 
its conclusion.294  Moreover, nowhere in this case did the court attempt to 
define investigative journalism.295  Similarly, in Blum, the Western District 
of New York extended the privilege to a student journalist who engaged in 
interviewing and interpretation when writing an article in the student 
newspaper.296  However, the court simply described the nature of the 
student’s article and did not link these attributes to its reason for extending 
the privilege.297  In addition, the court did not attempt to characterize 
investigative journalism in this case.298 
Although the two D.C. District Court cases that Peters cites provide the 
strongest support for his definition of investigative journalism, these two 
cases still fail to create a standard for investigative journalism that excludes 
journalists who neither provide analysis nor conduct in-depth research.  The 
McGraw-Hill court characterized journalistic analysis as something more 
than “simply reporting data,”299 but nowhere in its opinion did the court 
mention investigative journalism specifically.300  In Tripp, the court said 
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that interviewing individuals is a fundamental aspect of investigative 
journalism; however, the court never said that interviewing individuals was 
a determinative aspect of investigative journalism.301  Thus, the case law on 
the definition of investigative journalism is ambiguous, and Peters fails to 
establish that analysis, interpretation, and in-depth research are necessary 
components of investigative journalism. 
2.  Even If Investigative Journalism Requires More than the Mere Dumping 
of Documents, WikiLeaks Still Engages in Investigative Journalism 
Furthermore, even if the case law supports Peters’s definition of 
investigative journalism, WikiLeaks still engages in investigative 
journalism under Peters’s definition and therefore qualifies as a reporter 
under the current scope of the privilege.302  WikiLeaks engages in the type 
of investigative journalism that Peters describes is necessary to obtain the 
privilege.303  When WikiLeaks receives a document, it undertakes 
investigations to determine whether the document is authentic.304  Although 
the exact process for determining a document’s authenticity is unknown, 
WikiLeaks says that it researches—through both traditional and electronic 
methods—possible motives and opportunities for forgery.305  Also, 
WikiLeaks engages in editorial judgments when it filters the documents that 
it receives to determine which documents to publish.306  Moreover, at times, 
WikiLeaks consults with the government to redact the names of individuals 
who could be harmed through the documents’ publication.307  In addition, 
although not highly analytical, WikiLeaks publishes a short statement along 
with its published document.308  While the statement is similar to a press 
release, it still entails some editorial judgment and interpretation.309  
Furthermore, WikiLeaks spokesmen have engaged in more extensive 
commentary on their documents to the general public offline.310  Therefore, 
Wikileaks would qualify as a reporter under the current law. 
III.  RECONCEPTUALIZING THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE 
The current law on the scope of the federal reporter’s privilege is 
inadequate to address the complexities of today’s media landscape.311  The 
discussion in Part II exemplifies these inadequacies.  Part II illustrates that 
courts have failed to clearly define “investigative journalism,” which is 
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particularly problematic in the current media landscape.312  In addition, the 
question of whether WikiLeaks qualifies for the privilege is based merely 
on whether courts believe that WikiLeaks is engaged in investigative 
journalism.313  This distinction is futile because it does not fully relate to 
the purposes of the privilege.314  The required characteristic of investigative 
journalism does not fully ensure the free and robust flow of information to 
the public or the press’s independence.315  WikiLeaks serves an important 
function in disseminating news regardless of whether it engages in 
“investigative journalism.”316  Because of these shortcomings, scholars 
have proposed new policies to address the reporter’s privilege in light of 
new media, such as WikiLeaks.317  This Part outlines three different policy 
proposals and ultimately advocates for a statute that provides for a qualified 
privilege, the scope of which is determined by the source’s expectations, 
where the reporter presents the source’s expectations in court on behalf of 
the source. 
A.  Policy Proposals To Address the Privilege’s Shortcomings 
To more adequately address the reporter’s privilege in the contemporary 
media landscape, scholars have proposed new legal policies.318  First, this 
section discusses scholars’ arguments on whether Congress or the Supreme 
Court should determine the privilege’s scope.  Second, this section presents 
three different policy proposals:  Jones’s anonymous speech rights 
approach, Stone’s source-based approach, and Papandrea’s presumption of 
the privilege for all individuals who disseminate information with a few 
narrow exceptions. 
1.  Institutional Considerations:  Should Congress or the Courts Determine 
the Scope of the Reporter’s Privilege? 
The majority of scholars and commentators believe that Congress, rather 
than the judiciary, should determine the scope of the reporter’s privilege for 
four main reasons.319  First, courts have had over four decades to clearly 
delineate the scope of the privilege; however, the boundaries of the 
privilege remain inconsistent and unclear.320  Despite having ample 
opportunity to hear a reporter’s privilege case, the Supreme Court has 
refused to grant certiorari to a reporter’s privilege case since Branzburg in 
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1972.321  Second, determining who qualifies for the privilege is a difficult 
policy question that requires the factfinding ability of legislatures.322  Third, 
the Supreme Court cannot determine who is a reporter under the privilege 
as a matter of First Amendment interpretation because the idea of the Court 
defining or licensing the press is against constitutional traditions.323  Fourth, 
because judicial decisionmaking is often tied to the facts of the particular 
case in question, it is difficult for courts to formulate a uniform social 
policy.324 
On the contrary, other scholars argue that courts should define the 
privilege for two main reasons.325  First, political compromise is required in 
legislative channels, which often inhibits the best policy from being 
passed.326  Second, because Congress has demonstrated its unwillingness to 
confront the executive on national security matters, the executive branch 
will direct the policy.327  Thus, the President might largely control the 
content of the statute and it might not undergo adequate congressional 
investigation before it is passed.328 
2.  Policy Proposals 
This section discusses three scholars’ policy proposals to reconceptualize 
the reporter’s privilege in light of its current weaknesses.329  All of the 
proposals address the problem that occurs when defining the scope of the 
privilege through the definition of a reporter.  The proposals in Part 
III.A.2.a and III.A.2.b address this shortcoming by focusing on the qualities 
of the source rather than the qualities of the reporter.  The proposal in Part 
III.A.2.c addresses this shortcoming by broadly defining who qualifies as a 
reporter under the privilege. 
a.  Jones’s Approach:  Anonymous Speech Rights in the 
Confidential Source Context 
RonNell Anderson Jones asserts that courts should replace the reporter’s 
privilege with an anonymous speech rights approach in the confidential 
source–reporter scenario.330  Jones claims that the most fundamental 
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shortcoming of the reporter’s privilege is that the reporter has been at the 
center of the constitutional inquiry, which has complicated the doctrine and 
created an impractical test.331  In the newsgathering context, the source 
itself should be entitled to protection under the anonymous speech doctrine 
for confidential statements made to reporters.332 
Jones argues that analyzing confidential source cases using sources’ 
anonymous speech rights rather than reporters’ privilege rights will improve 
the doctrine for three main reasons.333  First, focusing on sources’ 
anonymous speech rights eliminates the need to define a reporter under the 
privilege.334  The task of defining a reporter has now become extremely 
complicated because of technological changes in newsgathering and 
dissemination.335  Second, a doctrine based on anonymous speech rights 
enables courts to abandon a speculative investigation into the contribution 
the press makes to public dialogue in order to determine what degree of 
privilege is necessary to ensure such continued contribution.336  Instead, 
this approach draws upon the clearly defined legal doctrine of anonymous 
speech.337  Third, the anonymous speech rights approach acknowledges 
other First Amendment values that can be reinforced through the 
confidential source dynamic, such as the source’s individual liberty.338 
The anonymous speech doctrine originally rests on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Talley v. California.339  In Talley, the petitioner distributed 
unsigned pamphlets promoting a boycott of merchants who he believed sold 
goods manufactured by companies that had discriminatory hiring 
practices.340  When the petitioner was charged with violating a local 
ordinance that prohibited the distribution of anonymous pamphlets, he 
challenged that ordinance’s constitutionality under the First Amendment.341  
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The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional because 
individuals are free to withhold their identity when they speak.342  The First 
Amendment must protect anonymous distribution of information to ensure 
that certain information will be disseminated.343 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its protection of anonymous speech rights 
in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.344  In McIntyre, the Court held 
that a citizen had a constitutional right to distribute pamphlets at a public 
meeting that were signed “Concerned Parents and Tax Payers” rather than 
with the citizen’s own name.345  The Court held that speaking anonymously 
is “an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.”346  Thus, the goals 
of anonymous speech rights overlap with the major objectives of the 
reporter’s privilege:  ensuring the free flow of information and reinforcing 
democratic self-governance.347 
Jones asserts that a confidential source in the reporting context is not 
different from speakers in other contexts who wish to convey information 
anonymously.348  The dynamic between a confidential source and a reporter 
is similar to other dynamics that occur between anonymous speakers and 
other modes of communication.349  Thus, the reporter’s source should be 
entitled to protection under the anonymous speech doctrine for statements 
he makes to a reporter in confidence.350 
Anonymous speech rights in the reporting context could be enforced in 
two ways.351  First, as a protected speaker, the source could assert his own 
right in court.352  Second, reporters and the news organizations that employ 
them may use third-party standing to assert their sources’ anonymous 
speech rights.353  In recent years, courts have exercised their discretion to 
allow third-party standing “‘whenever a practical impediment makes it 
difficult for a right-holder to assert her own rights and some relation exists 
between the right-holder and the party asserting third party standing.’”354  
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In the reporting context, those conditions are clearly satisfied because an 
anonymous source would not want to reveal his identity by asserting his 
own rights in court, and the reporter, as a vehicle for the source to 
disseminate information, has a relationship with the confidential source.355  
The use of third-party standing in this context differs from its usual use.356  
Third-party standing is most often used when a plaintiff asserts that a single 
application of a law injures him and impinges on the rights of identifiable 
third persons.357  However, one case, decided by the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, allowed third-party standing in a similar context to the 
confidential source–reporter scenario.358  The court held that a newspaper 
had third-party standing to assert the anonymous speech rights of 
anonymous commenters who had posted to the newspaper’s online 
forum.359 
b.  Stone’s Approach:  Privilege Based on the Source’s Expectations 
Rather than adopt the anonymous speech rights doctrine to the 
confidential source–reporter scenario, constitutional law scholar Geoffrey 
Stone maintains the privilege mechanism but suggests that the scope of the 
privilege should be based on the qualities of the source.360  The privilege 
belongs to the person whose communication society wants to encourage,361 
and therefore the privilege belongs to the source rather than the reporter.362  
A reporter is merely acting as the source’s agent when he invokes the 
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privilege.363  Thus, Stone asserts that the focus of the privilege’s scope 
should not be whether the reporter meets certain characteristics.364  Instead, 
the privilege’s scope should be based on the source’s characteristics.365 
The privilege should be most concerned with the source’s expectations 
rather than the recipient of the information’s credentials or qualities.366  The 
source should be protected whenever:  (1) he makes a confidential 
disclosure to an individual believing that the individual regularly 
disseminates information to the general public; and (2) his purpose is to 
disseminate the information to the general public through that individual.367  
Thus, Stone’s approach is based on a desire to expand the privilege’s scope 
beyond traditional journalists, while also keeping courts away from the 
difficult question of who qualifies as a reporter.368  However, Papandrea 
critiques this element of Stone’s proposal because Stone fails to explain 
how a court would determine the source’s intent when that source’s identity 
is supposed to be unknown and protected.369 
Moreover, Stone asserts that the privilege should be absolute.370  Because 
the privilege’s purpose is to encourage sources to disclose information to 
the public, a qualified privilege creates uncertainty in the privilege’s 
application that works against this goal.371  The only narrow exception to 
the absolute privilege would be when the source’s disclosure is itself an 
unlawful act.372  In this circumstance, courts should apply a balancing test 
based on the leak’s contribution to public debate.373  If the unlawful leak 
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c.  Papandrea’s Approach:  Presumptive Right to the Privilege for Those 
Who Disseminate Information to the Public with an Exception 
for Imminent National Security Threats 
Papandrea asserts that the history of the privilege demonstrates that the 
medium of communication should not determine whether the privilege 
should apply.375  Throughout the history of the privilege, state legislatures 
have constantly had to decide whether to expand the scope of the privilege 
beyond traditional newspaper reporters to journalists working in magazines, 
radio, and television.376  Thus, rather than basing the scope on the definition 
of a reporter, the scope should be based on the privilege’s underlying 
purpose:  increasing the amount of information available to the public while 
also making sure that those who disseminate information do not become an 
arm of the government or private parties.377  Because the privilege has a 
broad goal, it should cover a broad range of individuals.378  Anyone who 
contributes information to the public domain and intends the general public 
to read the information should be presumptively entitled to the privilege.379 
Papandrea proposes one exception to this broad privilege for imminent 
threats to national security.380  The basis for the national security exception 
is that in these circumstances the public’s interest in the information to 
protect against national security threats greatly outweighs the public’s 
interest in encouraging anonymous sources from coming forward.381 
Scholars have criticized the imminent national security exception as too 
expansive and deferential to the government.382  The government might 
exploit the imminent national security exception when the press leaks 
important government information, even though such disclosures are not 
imminent threats to warrant the exception.383  Judges further enforce this 
government tactic, as they are often wary of acting against the government 
when it proclaims that the country’s national security is threatened.384 
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B.  Advocating for a Qualified Privilege Based 
on the Source’s Expectations 
This section advocates for a new reporter’s privilege policy:  a qualified 
privilege based on the source’s characteristics.385  The first subpart of this 
section asserts that the reporter’s privilege should be addressed through 
congressional statute.  The second subpart advocates for defining the 
privilege’s scope using the source’s expectations rather than the qualities of 
the reporter.  The third subpart claims that the privilege should be qualified 
to accommodate two circumstances in which the public’s interest in the 
confidential source’s identity is greater than the public’s interest in 
promoting the free flow of information and an independent press.  The 
fourth subpart discusses whether WikiLeaks would be able to claim the 
privilege under this new policy. 
1.  Federal Statute 
The reporter’s privilege should be reformed through a federal statute 
rather than through the courts.  For over four decades, the courts have 
consistently failed to create a uniform and clear standard.386  Currently, 
there is a circuit split regarding the very existence of the privilege.387  The 
five circuits that have addressed the scope of the privilege have failed to 
sufficiently and clearly define key terms in that standard, such as 
investigative journalism.388  Moreover, the Supreme Court—which has the 
ability to address these inconsistencies and inadequacies in the lower 
courts’ holdings—has not taken a reporter’s privilege case since 1972.389  
The Supreme Court’s single decision on the privilege gave rise to the 
myriad problems discussed in this Note.390  Furthermore, Congress’s ability 
to extensively research this issue is essential to adequately defining the 
scope of the reporter’s privilege.391  Unlike the courts, Congress can consult 
a wide range of policy groups and members of the media industry.392 
Scholars who believe that courts are best equipped to define the scope of 
the privilege present two reasons to support their view.393  However, both 
of the reasons are flawed.  First, scholars assert that political compromise, 
which thwarts the formulation of the best policy, is necessary to pass a bill 
in Congress.394  However, it is unclear whether political compromise in fact 
inhibits the formulation of the most effective policy.  Such compromise 
might in fact create the most effective policy.  Also, judges have their own 
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biases and agendas that can inhibit an adequate policy from being reached.  
Second, scholars assert that the president will control the policy regarding 
the privilege.395  Because Congress usually will not confront the executive 
branch on such matters, these scholars assert that the statute will not 
undergo adequate congressional investigation before it is passed.396  While 
this might have been true generally throughout history, the president’s 
current ability to control policy in Congress is questionable.  Furthermore, 
because the Department of Justice—which ultimately is under the 
president’s control—would be involved with the bill’s enforcement,397 the 
president’s involvement could strengthen its implementation and 
enforcement.  Thus, Congress should pass a statute creating a reporter’s 
privilege and defining its scope. 
2.  Privilege Based on the Qualities of the Source 
This Note advocates for an approach that defines the scope of the 
privilege through the source’s expectations.  The reporter will then assert 
these expectations to the court on behalf of the source through third-party 
standing.  Thus, this Note promotes Stone’s approach and also takes into 
account the major shortcoming of Stone’s approach:  the failure to explain 
how courts could determine the source’s intent when the source’s identity is 
supposed to be protected.398  Under the First Amendment, properly 
interpreted, sources should not be deterred from giving information to the 
public to increase the free flow of information.399  Thus, the privilege 
should be based on qualities of the source rather than the qualities of the 
reporter.400  For a reporter to obtain the privilege (and for the source’s 
identity to be protected) under this proposal:  (1) the source must make a 
confidential disclosure to the reporter believing that the reporter 
disseminates information to the general public; and (2) the source’s purpose 
must be to disseminate the information to the general public through the 
reporter.401 
Because the source cannot directly assert his interests in court as his 
identity would be revealed,402 the court should determine the source’s 
purpose in revealing the information to the reporter through the reporter.403  
To obtain the privilege, the reporter will assert the source’s expectations on 
behalf of the source through the procedural mechanism of third-party 
standing.404  Although third-party standing has been met with some 
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resistance in federal courts405 and has not been commonly applied in this 
scenario,406 the ability for a reporter to meet the requirements for third-
party standing in the abstract,407 as well as a court’s grant of third-party 
standing in a similar context,408 supports the potential for third-party 
standing to be used here. 
This policy improves the current standard on the scope of the privilege in 
three main ways.  First, this policy eliminates the need to define “reporter” 
under the privilege, which has become extremely difficult given the rise of 
citizen journalism.409  Second, because this policy eliminates the need to 
define “reporter,” it creates a more timeless standard that will not need to be 
updated when the nature of the media changes in the future.410  Third, this 
approach creates a more inclusive standard that moves away from a focus 
on traditional journalism towards a more adequate reflection of the current 
media landscape.411  Reporters need not engage in traditional notions of 
“investigative journalism” to assert the privilege under this policy.412  The 
medium in which the reporter publishes his or her information is not 
relevant.413 
Although the policy that this Note proposes achieves the goals of Jones’s 
and Papandrea’s proposals, it does not endorse either of these proposals.  
Jones replaces the reporter’s privilege with an anonymous speech rights 
approach to protect anonymous sources.414  Jones’s anonymous speech 
proposal brings unnecessary complexity and change to the reporter’s 
privilege standard because it introduces the anonymous speech rights 
doctrine to the scenario that traditionally implicates the reporter’s privilege.  
The law on anonymous speech rights is separate from the law on the 
reporter’s privilege and has its own standards and case law history.415  The 
goals that Jones wishes to achieve can be reached through Stone’s source-
based proposal without bringing a new legal doctrine to the issue and 
replacing the privilege mechanism.416 
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Likewise, the policy advocated in this Note achieves Papandrea’s goals 
but more adequately reconceptualizes the privilege.417  This Note does not 
support Papandrea’s proposal because her proposal uses the same 
framework as the courts and proposed congressional statutes that have 
addressed the scope of the privilege by attempting to define “reporter.” 
Although Papandrea asserts that her policy is not based on the definition of 
a reporter but rather on the purpose of the privilege,418 she still uses the 
qualities of the person who is disseminating the information or the 
“reporter” to determine the privilege.419  Because Papandrea still focuses on 
the qualities of the reporter, her proposal has the potential to create the same 
problems that currently exist. 
3.  Qualified Privilege 
This Note advocates for a qualified privilege.  Because the privilege 
should encourage individuals to disclose information to the public, there 
should be only two narrow exceptions to the privilege:  (1) when the 
source’s disclosure is itself an unlawful act; and (2) in the case of an 
imminent threat to national security.420  Both of these exceptions are based 
on the belief that there are some circumstances in which the public’s 
interest in confidential information and its source are far greater than 
encouraging leakers to disclose information.421 
When the source’s disclosure is itself unlawful, the court should apply a 
balancing test based on the leak’s contribution to public debate versus the 
harm caused by the leak’s disclosure.422  In these circumstances, the 
privilege will be upheld only if the unlawful leak discloses information that 
is of substantial public value.423  The court should determine whether an 
unlawful leak is of substantial public value on a case-by-case basis looking 
at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the disclosure’s effects.424  
The court, for example, should look to the following factors:  potential 
physical harm to individuals, potential direct harm to U.S. national security, 
and exposure of unlawful government action.425  On one side of the 
spectrum would be information of little value to public debate, such as the 
publication of identities of covert CIA agents operating in foreign 
countries.426  On the other side of the spectrum would be information of 
substantial value to public debate, such as the government’s use of unlawful 
interrogation tactics, human rights violations, or the number of 
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noncombatant deaths during a war.427  On this side of the spectrum, the 
disclosure would not directly jeopardize U.S. national security, the lives of 
U.S. soldiers or other government officials, or innocent lives generally.428 
In addition, the reporter’s privilege should not be granted when the 
source’s identity is relevant to an imminent national security threat.429  
Although some scholars have criticized the imminent national security 
exception as having the potential to become too expansive,430 this reason 
alone is not enough to eliminate the exception—especially when innocent 
lives could be at stake. 
While this proposal will have some costs, such as depriving the factfinder 
of relevant evidence431 and revealing classified information,432 this policy 
seeks to balance these costs with the benefits of such disclosures.  The 
increased classification of government documents post-9/11 has decreased 
government transparency.433  In recent years, leaks of classified 
government documents have been central to exposing government abuses 
and unlawful actions during a time of government secrecy.434  For example, 
such leaks exposed the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and the 
National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping program.435  Thus, 
leaks serve as a check on government power.436  The policy proposed in 
this Note seeks to encourage the leaking of information that will expose 
government abuses.  However, the policy advocated in this Note also 
recognizes that leaks of classified documents should not be encouraged in 
all circumstances.  Certain information needs to remain classified—such as 
information that, if disclosed, could directly harm U.S. national security and 
the lives of U.S. government officials or innocent civilians—and the people 
have the right to obtain the identity of leakers who make such unlawful 
disclosures. 
4.  Applying the Policy Presented in This Note to WikiLeaks 
WikiLeaks would most likely be able to claim the privilege under this 
new policy.  The sources who leak documents to WikiLeaks most likely:  
(1) make confidential disclosures to WikiLeaks believing that WikiLeaks 
disseminates information to the public; and (2) leak documents so that the 
information will be disseminated to the public through WikiLeaks.  The 
exceptions to the privilege under this new policy seem more problematic for 
WikiLeaks.  WikiLeaks might not be able to claim the privilege if the 
disclosure of leaked information was itself unlawful or if the information 
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concerned an imminent national security threat.  However, if the disclosure 
of leaked documents is itself unlawful, WikiLeaks would still likely be able 
to obtain the privilege if the information that WikiLeaks discloses is of 
substantial public value.  For example, WikiLeaks would have to disclose 
the identification of a source who disclosed the names of Afghan 
informants to the United States, as occurred during the Afghan War Diaries 
release, because this disclosure was unlawful and had the potential to be a 
direct threat to the informants’ lives.437  However, WikiLeaks would be 
able to obtain the privilege if the unlawful leak solely revealed information 
about human rights abuses and the number of noncombatant deaths in the 
Iraq War, as was revealed during the Iraq War Logs.438  Moreover, 
although it seems plausible that WikiLeaks could receive information 
regarding an imminent national security threat because WikiLeaks has 
received classified government national security documents, WikiLeaks has 
yet to make such a disclosure.  Thus, WikiLeaks likely will be able to 
obtain the privilege in most circumstances under this Note’s proposed 
policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The current federal reporter’s privilege is rife with conflicts.439  Even for 
traditional journalists, the reporter’s privilege is unclear and inconsistent.440  
The rise of citizen journalism brings even more challenges to the privilege 
because it is more difficult to define who is a reporter in today’s media 
landscape.441  The debate regarding whether WikiLeaks may claim the 
privilege under the current law exemplifies the challenges that new media 
brings to the reporter’s privilege.442  Given changes in the media landscape 
and the increased classification of government documents, organizations 
like WikiLeaks do not seem to be going away.443  Thus, these 
inconsistencies and shortcomings should not remain unaddressed. 
Congress should pass a statute to bring much needed consistency and 
clarity to the reporter’s privilege.  Specifically, Congress should create a 
qualified privilege that is determined by examining the source’s 
expectations.  The reporter would assert the source’s intent in court on 
behalf of the source through third-party standing.  This approach would 
adequately address the problem of defining who is a reporter under the 
privilege, create a standard that accommodates citizen journalists, and 
achieve the privilege’s overarching goals.  With this new reporter’s 
privilege, WikiLeaks and its successors would have a clear standard to 
protect them from revealing their sources.  This clear standard would 
encourage WikiLeaks and organizations like WikiLeaks to continue to 
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disseminate leaked information to the public to expose government 
abuses—contributing to public discourse, enhancing democratic self-
governance, and ultimately achieving the societal values that the reporter’s 
privilege was meant to protect. 
 
